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The computer hacker is one of the most vilified figures in the digital era, but to what
degree are organizations actually responsible for compromised personal records? To
examine the role of organizational behavior in privacy violations, we analyze 589
incidents of compromised data between 1980 and 2006. There were more reported
incidents in 2005 and 2006 than in the previous 25 years combined. Excluding
a particularly large security breach at Acxiom, hackers account for the largest volume
of compromised records, some 45%, while 27% of the volume is attributed to organiza-
tional mismanagement and 28% remains unattributed. In terms of incidents, 9% were
an unspecified type of breach, 31% of the incidents involved hackers, and 60% of the
incidents involved organizational mismanagement: personally identifiable information
accidentally placed online, missing equipment, lost backup tapes, or other administra-
tive errors. Options for public policy oversight are discussed.
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Introduction
Recently, electronic personal records have become the subject of a great deal of
public interest. Their ubiquity has spurred debates about the nature of democracy,
the potential for electronic panopticism, and the erosion of personal privacy in an era
of increased police surveillance. Attention has been leveled at the various aspects of
data collection, data management (or mismanagement), and the potential for
unwanted disclosure of private records through loss or theft. In early 2005, a series
of high-profile cases culminating in the loss of more than 140,000 customer credit
records by the data mining firm ChoicePoint helped generate significant public
interest in the dangers associated with digital records of personal information. Then
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that summer, another 40,000 credit card records appeared on the black market for
personal data, and in the summer of 2006, the U.S. Department of Veterans’ Affairs
admitted that some 18,000 personal records had been compromised. Data security is
never perfect, and credit card companies, universities, and government agencies
cannot predict security lapses. But the growing number of news stories about com-
promised personal records reveals a wide range of organizational mismanagement
and internal security breaches: lost hard drives and backup tapes, employee theft, and
other kinds of administrative errors.
So far, blame has been directed at all parties involved: at the state, for being
lackadaisical in regulating institutions and businesses that deal with electronic
records; at the private sector, which is accused of de-prioritizing personal privacy
and information security; and finally at the end-users themselves, who are enjoined
by a variety of authorities and experts to take better care of managing their online
identities in order to mitigate the risk of fraud. A significant amount of the infor-
mation in these records concerns health and credit records, but such data are often
combined so that businesses, lobbyists, and politicians can generate a convincing
electronic portrait of an individual, thus effectively reconstituting their identity
(Howard, Carr, & Milstein, 2005). These stolen identities can also be used fraudu-
lently to deceive government agencies and credit institutions.
The threat of electronic data theft also has serious implications for societies that
increasingly rely on the security of data networks for day-to-day life. For example, as
more of our political system becomes computerized, there is a stronger possibility
that electronic data could contain information about an individual’s political beliefs
or voting records, which are now both easier to access and highly detailed (Howard,
2002, 2006). Yet most U.S. citizens report being uninterested in learning how to
manage their personal data better or in learning about how organizations mine for
data (Fox, 2000; Milne & Culnan, 2004). Today, however, both policy makers and
computer software and hardware companies are aggressive in enrolling individual
consumers in the task of securing their own data against loss or theft.
At the center of these privacy breaches is often the hacker archetype. Corporate
and government leaders have reframed the meaning of computer hacking, using
intellectual property law, court challenges, and amicus briefs, from a character work-
ing for freedom of access to technology and information to one who is deviant and
criminal (Nissenbaum, 2004). However, the actual role of hackers in the computer
security sector is considerably more complex. Many hackers not only enjoy technical
challenges, but are sometimes enlisted by corporations and governments for their
specific skills (Samuelson, 2003; Universal City Studios, 2000). Even though the
campaign against hackers has successfully cast them as the primary culprits to blame
for insecurity in cyberspace, it is not clear that constructing this target for blame has
improved the security of personal digital records.
This article explores how responsibility for protecting electronic data is currently
attributed and examines legislation designed to manage the problem of compro-
mised personal records. This makes it possible to compare the aims of legislation
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with an analysis of reported incidents of data loss for the period of 1980-2006.
A discrepancy between legislative responses to electronic data loss and the actual
damages incurred reveals that responsibility for maintaining the security of elec-
tronic personal records has been misplaced and should be re-examined. We conclude
with a brief discussion of the options for public policy oversight.
U.S. Legislation to Secure Electronic Records
Legal scholars often point out that new information technologies consistently pres-
ent legislators with the challenge of regulating issues for which there are no readily
apparent legal precedents. Lawmakers are frequently cast as lagging behind techno-
logical innovation, as they struggle to catch up with new forms of behavior enabled
by rapidly evolving technology. Traditional legal concepts such as private property
and trespass often become problematic when applied in online contexts enabled by
information and communication technologies.
For example, Cavazos and Morin (1996) have argued that in the case of defam-
atory, libelous, and obscene speech, the law has struggled to account adequately
for the nuances of computer-mediated communication. Offline publishers and re-
publishers of defamatory statements can be held liable, because it is expected that
they possess considerable editorial control over their own published content. How-
ever, when publication moves into an online setting, the distribution of liability
becomes less clear. Not all Internet publishers maintain strict editorial control,
and some media outlets function more like ‘‘conduits’’ through which news is
automatically updated. Other websites allow users to generate content, with limited
moderation provided by the system administrator. In both of these cases, it becomes
more difficult to assign responsibility for defamatory material.
The decentralized nature of computer networks poses other challenges for reg-
ulators. In cases involving obscenity, lawmakers in the United States have employed
a method known as the ‘‘community standards test’’ to determine whether pub-
lished material can be considered obscene. Material is deemed to lie outside the
protections afforded by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when it is
found to be offensive to the norms and standards of the community in which it is
located. While this method has functioned adequately in offline settings, it is less
effective when individuals from diverse communities can transmit information to
one another, often across state and national boundaries (Cavazos & Morin, 1996;
Zook, 2003). Early applications of the community standards test to online publish-
ers proved unworkable. In the case of United States v. Thomas (6th Cir., 1996)
a website operator located in California was tried and convicted in Tennessee for
violating the obscenity laws in the jurisdiction where the material was accessed,
rather than where the material was stored (‘‘United States v. Thomas,’’ 1996). This
case is often cited as evidence that current legislation is anachronistic and lags
behind the requirements of communication technologies that bypass traditional
jurisdictional boundaries.
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These jurisdictional conflicts become even more apparent in cases where law-
makers have attempted to regulate behavior across several legal jurisdictions, such as
in the cases of music piracy and online gambling. Faced with an overwhelming
number of users, along with the relative anonymity provided by computer-mediated
communication, prosecutors in the U.S. have tended to focus efforts on website
operators rather than on end users. The jurisdictional challenges posed by computer
networks continue to hamper their efforts in this regard, however, since offending
websites can be operated offshore in areas with less stringent regulation. The U.S. has
pursued this strategy in regard to online gambling, with limited success. Charges
brought by New York State against 22 online gambling websites in 1999 yielded only
one arrest, when the operator visited the U.S. on vacation (Wilson, 2003).
An additional problem facing legislation aimed at controlling online behavior is
its questionable effectiveness as a deterrent. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA) was passed in 1984 in response to growing political and media attention
surrounding the dangers of computer crime. The act criminalized unauthorized
access to private computer systems, making it a felony offense when trespass leads
to damages over a certain monetary threshold. The CFAA underwent major revisions
in 1986 and 1996, and it was further strengthened by the passage of the USA Patriot
Act in 2002. Overall, these revisions have served to make the act more broadly
applicable to various kinds of computer crime, while also increasing the punitive
response to these offenses.
For example, the revisions in 2002 were tailored to make it easier to surpass the
$5,000 felony threshold. The threshold was waived in cases where the computer
systems involved are used for national security or law enforcement purposes. In
cases not involving national security, the definition of ‘‘damage’’ was broadened to
include costs relating to damage assessment and lost revenue during an interruption
of service. The $5,000 threshold is also cumulative over multiple machines if more
than one system is involved in an attack.1 Additionally, the maximum sentence for
felony computer trespass was raised from five to 10 years for first-time convictions,
and from 10 to 20 years for repeat offenders (Skibell, 2003).
Given the relatively harsh penalties for computer trespass compared with other
crimes where victims suffer personal physical harm, it is surprising that the CFAA
has not been more effective as a deterrent. The apparent surge in computer-related
offenses, including the theft of online personal records, suggests that the punitive
nature of this legislation is not having the desired effect. Skibell (2002) argues that
not all computer crime is committed by self-interested or malicious criminals. The
belief that all hackers are malicious is essentially a myth—many members of the
computer hacker subculture do not condone destructive behavior and do not con-
sider their activities to be particularly malicious. Criminals who make use of hacker
techniques to access private data are rarely members of hacker communities, and
often less sophisticated in their hacker skill-set (Skibell, 2002). More legitimate
computer hackers appear to be motivated by codes of conduct internal to their
community and are therefore less likely to be deterred by legal sanctions. According
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to Jordan and Taylor (1998), these legitimate computer hackers are motivated by
a variety of concerns that make comparisons with other types of criminal behavior
problematic:
How often does a burglar leave behind an exact copy of the video recorder they
have stolen? [.] What bank robbers ring up a bank to complain of lax security?
The simple analogy of theft breaks down when it is examined and must be
complicated to begin to make sense of what hackers do. (p. 772)
These scholars argue that hacker projects are shaped by an ethical framework
formed by a strong sense of imagined community. Many hackers are interested in the
intellectual challenge and sense of mastery provided by computer networks, rather
than monetary rewards that could be gained from accessing sensitive information.
They seek to differentiate themselves from other computer criminals who use com-
puter networks for destructive, rather than creative, processes.
Furthermore, in recent years the core hacker community has been somewhat
successful at contesting the malicious meaning attached to the term ‘‘hacker.’’ While
the press often continues to report hackers as those responsible for most forms of
computer crime, more legitimate hackers have worked hard to distance themselves
from the sensationalist definition used by the news media. Many of them divide their
community into ‘‘white hat’’ and ‘‘black hat’’ constituencies to help distinguish those
who use their computer skills with malicious intent from those who do not. The term
‘‘cracker,’’ which now denotes individuals who destroy rather than improve com-
puter systems, indicates a deliberate rhetorical strategy on the part of some hackers to
bring nuanced understanding of the different aspects of computer hacking, particu-
larly among scholars interested in computer subcultures (Jordan & Taylor, 2004;
Thomas, 2002). In contrast, ‘‘gray hats’’ are those who publicly expose security flaws,
without concern for whether the act of exposure allows administrators to patch the
flaw or allows others to exploit the flaw. Moreover, mainstream computer security
experts have co-opted the term ‘‘blue hat’’ to further distinguish the community of
skilled computer users who hack in the service, and often employment, of Microsoft.
Arguably, the most significant threat posed by computer criminals comes not
from the core group of white, blue, or grey hat hackers but from individuals who
make use of hacker techniques to invade systems for monetary gain. Since knowledge
and tools developed by more experienced hackers can easily be obtained on the
Internet, the capability to penetrate insecure networks has propagated outside of
the legitimate hacker community to other groups, ranging from inexperienced teen-
agers to international crime syndicates.2 These individuals may feel protected from
the law due to the relative anonymity of computer-mediated communication, or
they may be located in jurisdictions where harsh criminal penalties for computer
fraud do not apply.
While the CFAA aids in the prosecution of criminals who engage in electronic
data theft and trespass, individual states have recently taken additional legal steps to
regulate the management of electronic records. In 2003, the state of California
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introduced a new provision to the Information Practices Act, termed the ‘‘Notice of
Security Breach.’’ This addition to the California Civil Code obliges any business or
agency that has been the victim of a security breach to notify any parties whose
personal information may have been compromised. The California legislation
defines ‘‘personal information’’ as an individual’s full name, in combination with
one of the following types of data:
(1) Social security number
(2) Driver’s license number or California Identification Card number
(3) Account number, credit or debit card number, in combination with any
required security code, access code, or password that would permit access to
an individual’s financial account.
The company or institution responsible for handling the compromised data
must notify potential victims individually, unless the cost of notification exceeds
a threshold amount of $250,000, or if the total number of individuals affected is
greater than 500,000. In these cases, substitute notification can be made using a com-
bination of e-mail notification and disclosure to major media outlets. Notification
must be carried out:
in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay, consistent
with the legitimate needs of law enforcement [.] or any measures necessary to
determine the scope of the breach and restore the reasonable integrity of the
data system. (California Civil Code 1798.29)
Following California’s footsteps, 34 additional states have enacted similar legis-
lation as of 2007.3 For the most part, individual state legislatures have maintained the
spirit of the California provision, including the extension of liability to both busi-
nesses and agencies, as well as the notification threshold.
The aim of the ‘‘notification of breach’’ legislation is significantly different from
that of the CFAA. By making corporations and institutions liable for damages
potentially incurred by customers and clients, this legislation to some extent seeks
to discipline offenders who engage in poor record-keeping practices. Both the indi-
rect threat of future litigation and the potential for public embarrassment are
intended to improve data security in both the public and private sector. Unlike
the CFAA, however, this legislation does not directly address the issue of network
security. It does not formalize standards or rules for information security, nor does it
make businesses and institutions accountable for poor security practices that may
make them vulnerable to attack. The legislation punishes businesses only for failing
to notify the public, rather than for negligence in securing electronic records.
Since adequately securing a computer network from intrusion is an expensive
prospect, this legislation essentially lets businesses off the hook, by making them
liable for damages only when they fail to notify affected individuals that their data
have been compromised. Interestingly, by failing to assign responsibility for data loss
to those agencies that manage electronic personal information, this legislation serves
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in part to shift that responsibility to the individual user, since it is he or she who must
take steps to protect their identity once notified of a breach.
This sentiment is supported by the California Department of Consumer Affairs,
which maintains a website devoted to online privacy protection. The agency has also
distributed a flyer listing the ‘‘top 10 tips for identity theft prevention.’’ This list
enjoins consumers to take active steps to avoid becoming the victims of electronic
fraud, by shredding personal documents, installing up-to-date computer virus and
firewall software, and becoming vigilant about which sites they visit and how they use
their credit cards. Consumers are also urged to take a more proactive role in moni-
toring their personal credit rating, in order to detect potential fraud. The Depart-
ment of Consumer Affairs recommends that individuals apply for free credit reports
at least three times per year in order to prevent misuse of their electronic identity.
So far, the legal responses to electronic identity theft in the U.S. have sought to
minimize the direct involvement by the state, instead relying on a partnership between
the interests of private institutions and the consumers of those services. The two major
forms of legislation governing the security of computer records in the U.S.—the CFAA
and the California Notification of Breach laws—closely resemble offline governmental
strategies that seek to place responsibility on individual consumer-citizens while dis-
ciplining those who do not adequately protect themselves (Burchell, 1996; Peck &
Tickell, 2002). Moreover, the reticence of public agencies in the U.S. to draft legislation
that would directly influence the terrain of data security is consistent with the overall
trend of regulatory devolution, a shift that began before the information sector occu-
pied such a primary position in the national economy.
The legislative choices that policymakers in the U.S. have made to combat the
problem of data insecurity have been shaped by the tenet that governments should
interfere only minimally with markets. Thus, legislative initiatives have eroded public
policy oversight of corporate behavior. In the arena of data security for private
information, this erosion has meant de-emphasizing the role of government and
public policy oversight in data security, encouraging industry self-regulation among
the firms benefiting in the retention of personal data, and increasing individual
responsibility for managing one’s personal data.
Analysis of Compromised Electronic Records, 1980–2006
We conducted a search of incidents of electronic data loss reported in major U.S.
news media from 1980 to 2006. These included print publications with national
circulation such as the New York Times, the L.A. Times, and USA Today, along with
major broadcast news media. Because some news reports contained references to
more than one incident, we employed a snowball methodology to expand our
analysis by including additional security breaches mentioned in the same article.
Duplicate entries were eliminated by comparing news stories on the basis of organ-
izations involved, dates, and other incident details. In cases where newspapers
reported different quantities of lost records, we chose the most conservative report.
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We also consulted lists of electronic data breaches compiled by third party computer
security advisories, such as the Identity Theft Resource Center (www.idtheftcenter.
org) and Attrition.org. Our method yielded 589 incidents, 550 of which were suc-
cessfully cross-checked with LexisNexis and Proquest to ensure accuracy, and 39 of
which we discarded for involving citizens of other countries or for being unverifiable
in major news media reports.4
There are interesting advantages and disadvantages to using printed news sources
to construct the history of computer hacking and breached private records. As stated
above, the mainstream media often equate hackers with any crime involving a com-
puter and use the misnomer ‘‘hacker’’ without a nuanced understanding of the
history of more legitimate computer hacking. We continue to use the term in this
analysis, because it is the most commonly used term in media reports where an
intruder was deemed responsible for compromised data. Instead of media reports,
criminal records would certainly provide details about the prevalence of malicious
intrusions. Unfortunatley, such records are extremely difficult to collect nation-wide.
Moreover, a survey of incidents composed through criminal records would signifi-
cantly over-sample incidents where an individual hacker was at fault, and signifi-
cantly under-sample incidents where an organization was culpable but not deemed
criminally negligent. Over the decade, journalists would not have discovered all
incidents, and even though current California law requires that a person whose data
had been compromised be so informed, such a breach is not necessarily noted in
news archives. However, journalists do their best to report the facts, and in the
absence of a public agency that might maintain comprehensive incident records
on privacy violations, news accounts provide a good accessible resource.
Our list of reported incidents is limited to cases where one or more electronic
personal records were compromised through negligence or theft. We acknowledge
that there may be occasions where end-users consider their personal information
compromised when the data are sold among third parties for marketing purposes
without their informed consent. For this study, we look only at incidents of com-
promised records that are almost certainly illegal or negligent acts.
For the purposes of this study, we define electronic personal records as data
containing privileged information about an individual that cannot be readily
obtained through other public means. Rather than become involved in the broader
debate about the virtues and dangers of online anonymity, we have chosen to focus
only on data that are more sensitive than the information that we regularly volunteer
in the course of surfing the web (such as one’s name or IP address). We define
‘‘personal data’’ to be information that should reasonably be known only to the
individual concerned or be held by an organization under the terms of a confiden-
tiality agreement (such as between a patient and a care provider). Electronic personal
records therefore could include individuals’ personal credit histories, banking infor-
mation such as credit card numbers or account numbers, medical records, social
security numbers, and grades earned at school. We focused only on incidents where
compromised personal records were kept for a legitimate purpose by a company,
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institution, or government agency. Consequently, ‘‘phishing’’ or spoofing scams
where victims are deceived into volunteering their own personal information are
not included in our analysis. All of the incidents in our analysis deal with data that
were maintained as digital files, although in some cases compromised data were
contained on a lost or stolen laptop computer.
Between 1980 and 2006, some 1.9 billion records were reported compromised by
government agencies, firms, hospitals, universities, and the military. This is the sum
of compromised records from 529 cases in which some estimate of the volume of lost
records was offered, although in 60 of these incidents the impact of the security
breach was unknown. In a sense, this number of lost records is larger than we might
expect because a few landmark incidents account for large portions of the total
number of records compromised. On the other hand, the number of confirmed
incidents—550 in all—may seem smaller than expected given the 26-year time frame
of our search. Some articles report multiple incidents, and of course many incidents
were covered by journalists on multiple occasions.
In 2004, the Census Bureau estimated that there were 217 million adults living in
the United States. We can conservatively estimate that for every U.S. adult, in the
aggregate, nine private records have been compromised. Unfortunately we cannot
know how many of these compromised private records have actually been used for
identity theft, or how many were sold to marketing companies.
Table 1 reveals the number of reported incidents and volume of compromised
records between 1980 and 2006, along with their distribution by sector. The majority
of incidents involved commercial actors, less than one-third of the incidents involved
colleges and universities, and the remainder involved government, hospitals, and
the military. When the exceptional loss of 1.6 billion personal records by Acxiom
Corporation is removed, the commercial sector still accounted for approximately
252 million individual compromised records, four times that of the next-highest
contributor, the government sector.5
The education sector accounted for a small percentage of the overall quantity of
lost records, but accounted for 30% of all reported incidents, suggesting that edu-
cational institutions suffer from a higher rate of computer insecurity than might be
anticipated. This could be explained by the fact that colleges and universities gen-
erally maintain large electronic databases on current and past students, staff, faculty,
and alumni, and have an organizational culture geared towards information sharing.
However, medical institutions—which presumably also maintain large quantities of
electronic data—reported a significantly lower number of incidents of data loss.
These differences may be the result of strong privacy legislation in the arena of
medical information, but comparatively weak privacy legislation in the arena of
educational and commercial information.
Although Table 1 has aggregated 26 years’ worth of incidents, the bulk of the
reports occur in 2005 and 2006, after legislation in California, Washington, and other
states took effect. There were three times as many incidents in the period between
2005 and 2006 as there were in the previous 25 years. Interestingly, the mandatory
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reporting legislation seems to have exposed educational institutions as a major
source of leakage of private data. In total, 38% of the incidents involved commercial
firms, but specifically in 2005 and 2006, 35% of the incidents involved educational
institutions. These kinds of organizations may have been the least equipped to pro-
tect the data of their students, staff, faculty, and alumni.
For the majority of incidents, the news article reports some information about
how the records were compromised. A closer reading of each of the incidents,
however, reveals that most incidents involve combinations of mismanagement,
criminal intent, and, occasionally, bad luck. The hacker label is often used, even
when the theft is perpetrated by an insider, such as a student or employee. Moreover,
company public relations experts often posit that personal records were only
‘‘exposed,’’ not compromised, when employees post private records to a website
or lose a laptop and the company cannot be sure that anyone has taken specific
advantage of the security breach.
Table 2 reveals that the legislation has also seemed to have the effect of forcing
the reporting organizations to reveal more detail about the ways these private records
get compromised. In the early reports, most incidents were described as an unspec-
ified breach or as the general result of hacker activity. However, for the period
between 2000 and 2006, only 31% of the incidents were about a breach caused by
a hacker, 8% of the incidents involve an unspecified breach, and 61% of the incidents
involved different kinds of organizational culpability. For example, sometimes man-
agement accidentally exposed private records online, administrative error resulted in
leaked data, or employees were caught using the data for activities not related to the
work of the organization. On some occasions, staff simply misplaced backup tapes,
while on others, computer equipment such as laptops were stolen.6
A single incident, involving 1.6 billion compromised records at Axciom,
accounts for a large portion of the volume of records lost in the period 2000-
2006.7 If this event is removed from this period, then 32% of the compromised
volume and 30% of the incidents are related to hackers, 48% of the compromised
volume and 62% of the incidents involve organizational behavior, and 20% of the
compromised volume and 8% of the incidents remain unattributed. If this event is
removed from the volume of compromised records for the whole study period—
between 1980 and 2006—then 45% of the total volume of compromised records
related to hackers, 27% of the volume was attributed to the organization, and 28%
remained unattributed. If this event is removed from the total number of incidents
for the whole study period, then 31% of the incidents involved hackers, 60%
involved organizational management, and 9% remain unattributed. Regardless of
how the data are broken down, hackers never account for even half of the incidents
or the volume of compromised records.
If we distinguish the reported incidents that clearly identify a hacker from those
concerning some other form of breach, the organizational role in these privacy
violations moves into sharp relief. Figure 1 separates the count of stories in which
a hacker was clearly identified as the culprit from those stories where the cause of the
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breach was unspecified and from those stories where the cause of the breach was
related to organizational action or inaction. In this latter category, we consider
organizational behavior to include four types of security breach: accidental exposure
of personal records online, insider abuse or theft, missing or stolen hardware, or
other administrative error.
First, it is noticeable that as more states require organizations to report compro-
mised digital records, the overall volume of annual news stories on the topic increases
significantly. In fact, there were more reported incidents in 2005 and 2006 than in the
previous 25 years combined. We found 126 incidents of compromised records
between 1980 and 2004, and 424 incidents between 2005 and 2006. Just summing
the incidents from 2005 and 2006, when mandatory reporting legislation was in place
in many states, we find that 68% of the stories concern data that were accidentally
placed online or exposed through administrative errors, stolen equipment, or other
security breaches such as employee loss of equipment or backup tapes.
Several factors might explain the pattern of increasing incidents and volume of
compromised data over time. First, there is the possibility that the results are skewed
due to the relative growth of new, fresh news stories devoted to this issue, and the loss
of older stories that disappeared from news archives as time passed. Perhaps there
have always been hundreds of incidents every year, but only in recent years has the
severity of the problem been reported in the news. If this were the case, we would
expect to see a gradually decaying pattern with greater numbers of reported cases in
2006 than in 2005, 2004, and so on. However, the dramatic difference in reported
incidents between later years and early years suggests that this effect does not ade-
quately explain our observations.
A second possibility is that increased media attention or sensational reporting in
2005 and 2006 led to a relative over-reporting of incidents compared with previous
years. Literature onmedia responses toperceived crises or ‘‘moral panics’’ would suggest
that a similar effect commonly accompanies issues that are granted a disproportionate
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Figure 1 Hacker and organizational culpability in reported incidents of compromised
records, 1980–2006
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amount of public attention, such as with the case of the mugging scare in Great
Britain in the 1970s or the crackdown on the rave subculture in the 1990s (Critcher,
2003; Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Robert, 1978). While it is unlikely that
media outlets have exaggerated the amount of electronic personal record loss, it is
possible that in previous years a certain number of events went unreported in the
media due to lack of awareness or interest in the issue of identity theft.
A third possibility is that there were a greater number of reported incidents of
data loss in 2005 and 2006 because institutions are maintaining and losing a larger
quantity of electronic data, and because a changing legislative environment in many
states is obliging institutions to report events publicly that may have gone unre-
ported in previous years. The fourth possibility, and the most plausible one, is that
mandatory reporting legislation has exposed both the severity of the problem and the
common circumstances of organizational mismanagement.
It is likely that a combination of factors explain our observations. The Notifica-
tion of Breach legislation that requires the prompt reporting of lost records in
California came into effect in 2003. However, the legislation was not widely adopted
and implemented by other states until 2005, which might help to explain the dra-
matic increase in reported cases. The Notification of Breach legislation in California,
as in many other states, requires notification when a state resident has been a victim
of data loss, regardless of where the offending institution resides. Therefore, insti-
tutions located in states without Notification of Breach laws, such as Oregon, are still
required to report cases to victims who live in states that have enacted this type of
legislation, such as New York. The nature and complexity of many databases means
that in many cases, compromised databases are likely to contain information about
residents who are protected by notification of breach legislation, thus increasing the
total number of reported cases.
Conclusion
Surveying news reports of incidents of compromised personal records helps expose
the diverse situations in which electronic personal records are stolen, lost, or mis-
managed. More important, it allows us to separate incidents in which personal
records have been compromised by outside hackers from incidents in which breaches
were the result of an organizational lapse. Of course, organizations should be
expected to perform due diligence and safeguard the digital records holding personal
information from attack by malicious intruders. But often organizations are both
the unwilling and unwitting victims of a malicious hacker. Through this study of
reported incidents of compromised data, we found that two-fifths of the incidents
over the last quarter century involve malicious hackers with criminal intent.
Surprisingly, however, the proportion of incident reports involving hackers is
smaller than the proportion of incidents involving organizational action or inaction.
While 31% of the incidents reported clearly identify a hacker as the culprit, 60%
of the incidents involve missing or stolen hardware, insider abuse or theft,
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administrative error, or accidentally exposing data online. The remainder of the news
stories record too little information about the breach to determine the cause: Either
organizations or individual hackers might be to blame for some of these incidents.
Organizations probably can be blamed for the management practices that result
in administrative errors, lost backup tapes, and data exposed online. And even
though an organization can be the victim of theft by its employees, organizations
might still be expected to develop suitable safeguards to ensure the safety of client,
customer, or member data. Even using the news media’s expansive definition of
hacker as a basis for coding stories, we find that a large portion of the security
breaches in the U.S. are due to various forms of organizational malfeasance.
One important outcome of the mandatory reporting legislation is improved
information about the types of security breaches. Many of the news stories between
1980 and 2004 report paltry details, with sources being off the record and vague
estimates of the severity of the security breach. Since reporting legislation became
mandatory in many states, most news coverage provides more substantive details.
In 2006, only 10 of the 257 news stories were unable to make some attribution of
responsibility for a security breach.
Legislators at the federal and state level have adopted two main strategies to
address the problem of electronic record management. On one hand, they have
directly targeted those individuals (computer hackers) whose actions potentially
threaten the security of private electronic data. The CFAA has been repeatedly
strengthened in response to a perception that electronic data theft represents a mate-
rial and growing concern. The fact that punishments for digital trespass now surpass
those for many other more violent forms of crime suggests that federal legislators
consider computer crime to constitute a serious threat to our personal and collective
security. However, the data in this study suggest that malicious intrusion by hackers
makes up only a portion of all reported cases, while other factors, including poor
management practices by organizations themselves, contribute more to the problem.
The second strategy employed by regulators might be thought of as an indirect or
‘‘disciplinary’’ strategy. Notification of Breach legislation obliges institutions that
manage electronic data to report any loss of that data to the individuals concerned.
While this directly addresses the problem of consumer protection by empowering
individuals to protect themselves in case of lost or stolen data, it has probably been
intended to produce secondary effects. Companies and institutions, wary of both the
negative publicity and the financial costs generated by an incident of data loss, are
encouraged to adopt more responsible network administration practices. Similarly,
end-users are urged toweigh both the risk of doing business electronically and the costs
associated with taking action once they are notified of a potential breach. The practice
of using a risk/reward calculus to achieve policy objectives through legislation has been
termed governing ‘‘in the shadow of the law’’ by some authors in the critical legal
studies and governmentality literature (Mnookin & Kornhauser, 1979; Rose, 1999).
One potential problem with this strategy is that the risks and rewards will be
unequally distributed among various individual, state, and corporate actors. While
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a large corporation might possess the resources and technical skill necessary to encrypt
data, secure networks, and hire external auditors, other institutions in the private or
public sector may not find the risk of potential record loss worth the expenditure
necessary to secure those data. Governing through this type of market discipline is
likely to result in a wide spectrum of responses from differentially situated actors.
There are a number of alternatives open to lawmakers and policy advisors that
could materially strengthen the security of electronic personal records in this country.
Alternatives include setting stricter standards for information management, levying
fines against institutions that violate information security standards, and mandating
the encryption of all computerized personal data. However, the introduction of
legislation to directly regulate institutions that handle electronic information would
certainly be controversial. A wide variety of agencies, companies, and organizations
manage personal records on a daily basis. This complexity would hinder the impo-
sition of standardized practices such as encryption protocols. Corporations would
probably balk at the prospect of having to pay fines or introduce expensive security
measures and would accuse the government of heavy-handed interference. Others
might argue that the imperatives of free-market capitalism demand that the govern-
ment refrain from adopting punitive legislation, especially in order to maximize
competitiveness. Identity theft can have a significant impact on individuals whose
identity is stolen, and can taint the reputation of the organization that was compro-
mised. But in the incidents studied here, the security breach is most often attributed
to large corporations, and increasingly universities, rather than individual hackers.
Although computer hacking has been widely reframed as a criminal activity and
has received increasingly harsh punishments, the legal response has obfuscated the
responsibility of commercial, educational, government, medical, and military organ-
izations for data security. The scale and scope of electronic record loss over the past
decade would suggest that organizational self-regulation or self-monitoring is failing to
keep people’s personal records secure, and that the state has a more direct role to play
in protecting personal information. State-level initiatives have helped expose the prob-
lem by making it possible to collect better data on the types of security breaches that
are occurring and to make some judgments about who is responsible for the breaches.
If public policy can be used to create incentives for organizations to manage personally
identifiable information better and punish organizations for mismanagement, such
initiatives would probably have to come at the state level. Electronically stored data
might very well be weightless, but the organizations that retain personally identifiable
information must shoulder more of the heavy burden for keeping such data secure.
Notes
1 In practice, the monetary felony threshold has proved somewhat meaningless, since
the value of computer code compromised during intrusion is often quoted well in
excess of $5,000. In the case of United States v. Mitnick (9th Cir. 1998), Sun
Microsystems claimed $80 million in damages related to the cost of research and
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development of the source code that Mitnick copied during his intrusion (‘‘United
States v. Kevin Mitnick,’’ 1998).
2 In our survey, some incidents involving U.S.-based organizations or U.S. citizens
were reportedly carried out by individuals working outside the United States. For
example, the 2001 theft of customer account information from Bloomberg Financial
was carried out by a Kazak citizen named Oleg Zezov, who threatened to expose the
information unless the company paid him $250,000.
3 The National Conference of State Legislatures maintains a website to track this kind of
legislation, whether enacted or pending: http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/
breach.htm.
4 We retained incidents that had been reported in multiple sources, even if no exact
number of compromised records was reported. To be conservative, we recorded
these incidents as having 0 compromised records. In news stories where it was only
reported that ‘‘hundreds’’ or ‘‘thousands’’ of personal records were compromised, we
recorded 100 or 1,000 compromised records.
5 The records lost by Acxiom Corporation consisted of credit card numbers, purchasing
histories, and marital status of individuals.
6 We believe it is more likely that computer equipment is stolen for personal use or resale
value, rather than for the data that thieves might suspect is on the hard drives of the
equipment they steal.
7 This single case is illustrative of the challenge of compiling and comparing incidents of
compromised personal records. For example, the Axciom incident involved an
employee of Snipermail.com, who removed 8.2 gigabytes of personal data in 137 sep-
arate incidents between April 2002 and August 2003. To be consistent with our sam-
pling, we record this as a single incident occurring in 2004, because the news coverage
and his arrest did not occur until 2004. Axciom, the company that was entrusted with
personal records, and even justice officials commenting on the case, describe the culprit
as a hacker. However, there was actually a client relationship between the two firms, and
Snipermail.com staff legitimately had the correct password to upload data to Axciom
servers. Someone at the Snipermail.com firm guessed that the same password might
also be used to download data, though Snipermail.com was not legitimately allowed to
do so. Some might argue that this is an example of a poor security choice on the part of
Axciom, rather than an example of an ingenious technical exploitation by a rogue
outsider with a hacker’s skills. However, the majority of cases we label as ‘‘insider abuse’’
involve employees. The culprit in this case did legitimately have some insider infor-
mation about Axciom’s security. To be conservative, and since we are interested in how
the news media frames issues of data security, we code this incident as involving data
stolen by a hacker, because that was the language used in news coverage; we do not code
it as insider abuse, because the culprit was not an employee.
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